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Since the Warren Court, minorities have relied on courts to defend
against majority oppression. A key weapon in this battle for full citizen-
ship, especially in the educational context, has been the equal protection
clause.' Brown v. Board of Education declared that "[s]eparate educa-
tional facilities are inherently unequal" and are prohibited by the equal
protection clause.2 On the basis of Brown and its progeny, courts have
integrated entire school systems.'
School desegregation has benefited disadvantaged groups enormously.
In the generation since executive branch and court-ordered desegregation
plans have significantly desegregated schools, minority student perform-
ance in desegregated public schools has improved greatly.- Minorities'
performances on standardized achievement and intelligence quotient tests
have risen in desegregated settings,5 as have career opportunities of minor-
ities attending desegregated schools.6 According to one scholar, no reform
short of individual tutorials can improve the quality of minority students'
education more than desegregating their schools.'
Courts have not completely fulfilled Brown's promise, however. Some
school systems have never been desegregated, while others have resegre-
1. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., J. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 11, 134
(1984) ("Desegregating elementary and secondary public schools is perhaps the most important means
our generation has used to eradicate racism. . . . [Wiere it not for courts[' use of the equal protection
clause], there would be little reduction in racial isolation [in schools] .... .
2. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
3. E.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); United States v. Scotland Neck
City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); see G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456-95
(1986); R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN. THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
(1984).
4. See, e.g., M. WEINBERG, THE SEARCH FOR QUALITY INTEGRATED EDUCATION 146-76
(1983) (reviewing literature); Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of the Poor, 95
YALE L.J. 1700, 1710-11 nn.36-42 (1986).
5. See Mahard & Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in Desegregated Schools, in THE
CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 124 (C. Rossell & W. Hawley eds. 1983).
6. See T. COOK, BLACK ACHIEVEMENT AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 9, 85 (1984).
7. Address by James Liebman, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Conference, Airlie, Virginia (Nov.
4, 1988); cf. T. CooK, supra note 6, at 85 (finding that Blacks educated in desegregated schools are
more likely to graduate from high school and college and to major in more remunerative subjects).
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gated, placing minority educational gains in danger.8 The most recent
thorough study of the condition of Blacks in America concludes that, to
black students' detriment, "[slegregation and differential treatment of
blacks continue to be widespread in schools."'
One obstacle to the desegregation of schools is that plaintiffs must
demonstrate that government actions are intentionally discriminatory
rather than that they simply have discriminatory effects. According to
post-Brown Supreme Court doctrine, only intentional segregation offends
the Constitution. Yet proving discriminatory intent by school boards has
become increasingly difficult as school boards today are far more likely to
mask discriminatory motives than in the past."1 Unlike twenty-five years
ago when many school boards openly segregated schools, current govern-
ment actors veil their intent by avoiding the creation of a "paper trail"
that would facilitate findings of discrimination.' Therefore, as one com-
mentator has stated regarding proof of racially discriminatory intent,
"[t]he important questions are all evidentiary."'I Discriminatory mo-
8. See, e.g., G. ORFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-1980,
at 15 (1983) (finding increase in percentage of black students in predominantly minority schools be-
tween 1978 and 1980); Suttles, School Desegregation and the "National Community," in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION RESEARCH 58 (J. Prager ed. 1986) (finding considerable resegregation in South).
9. A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 379 (G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds.
1989) (report by the Committee on the Status of Black Americans, National Research Council, Wash-
ington, D.C.).
10. Discriminatory intent was not discussed by the Supreme Court in Brown because it was clear
from the face of the statutes. In Keyes v. School District, 413 U.S. 189, 198, 208-10 (1973) (Denver),
the Court confronted for the first time racial imbalance in a northern school system with no history of
statutorily authorized school segregation. In that case, it held that segregation must be intentional to
violate the Constitution. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1979), an employment case
under the equal protection clause, the Court required inquiry into the subjective purpose behind
challenged governmental decisions. See also Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (reaf-
firming subjective standard of intent).
11. Many recent cases have foundered on the issue of intent. E.g., School Board v. Baliles, 829
F.2d 1308 (4th Cir. 1987) (Richmond); Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) (Nor-
folk); Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1982) (Akron); Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of
Educ., 454 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ohio 1978), affd, 675 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1982). Other suits simply
are not brought because of the difficulty of proving intent. Norman Chachkin of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, an organization at the forefront of school desegregation efforts in this country, states
that the difficulty of proving intent deters the initiation of large numbers of cases. Telephone inter-
view with Norman Chachkin, New York (Oct. 26, 1989).
12. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (difficult for court to ascertain
motivation of group of legislators); Hart v. Community School Bd. 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Brooklyn) (same with school board); see also Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.8 (5th Cir.
1981) ("[T]here will be no 'smoking gun'" to prove discriminatory intent), affd sub nom., Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (voting rights case); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d
400, 412 (7th Cir. 1980) (Indianapolis) ("[In an age when it is unfashionable for state officials to
openly express racial hostility, direct evidence of overt bigotry will be impossible to find."), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978); Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and
1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 686 (1985) ("Both at the individual and institutional levels, racism
is typically far more subtle, indirect, and ostensibly nonracial now than it was in 1964, during the full
swing of the Civil Rights Movement. Consequently, detection and remedy have become more diffi-
cult."); Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1413 (1979) (past equal protection decisions have educated officials not to rely
on racial classifications).
13. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitu-
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tives are buried deeper, but they have not disappeared. As the recent ra-
cial incidents in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn and in Virginia
Beach demonstrate, racial animus appears alive and well in the era since
Brown. 4 It is unlikely that school boards, which reflect the values of the
community, would not also mirror this prejudice.
Recognizing the impossibility that a school board will confess to charges
of racism, courts have admitted circumstantial evidence as relevant to the
issue of discriminatory intent.1 5 The judicial choice of which evidence of
the plaintiff to admit as relevant can be determinative of the outcome of a
school desegregation case."6 In determining which circumstantial evidence
is relevant, courts in practice have limited admissible evidence to that
which focuses exclusively on school board actions? Courts deem other
actors irrelevant unless plaintiffs can make the often impossible showing
that the non-defendants acted in concert with the school board intention-
ally to segregate schools. Courts therefore exclude evidence of substantial
prejudice in the community-the "roots" of the school board's discrimina-
tion-or discrimination in other parts of municipal government-the
"branches"-from serving as inferential proof of discriminatory motive by
the school board.'
This Note argues that exclusive judicial consideration of the school
board's behavior wrongly ignores the link between the school board and
the broader political system and community of which the board is only a
part."9 The Note attempts to help restore the efficacy of school desegrega-
tion litigation by examining more fully the social context in which school
board decisions take place. Part I demonstrates that courts stringently
tional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1130 (1978) (emphasis in
original); see also Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 925, 938 (1978) (noting importance of evidentiary questions in proving intent).
14. Many commentators have, in fact, detected a resurgence of racism. See Mouat, U.S. More
Tolerant of Racism, Civil Rights Leaders Say, Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
See generally A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 9 (detailing existence of current discrimination);
QUIET RIOTS: RACE AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (F. Harris & R. Wilkins eds. 1988)
(same); D. NEWMAN, PROTEST, POLITICS, AND PROSPERITY (1978) (same).
15. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266-67 (1977) (calling for "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as
may be available"). According to the court in a housing case,
In this day and age, when racial discrimination is no longer as fashionable as it was a genera-
tion or two ago, racists are more cautious than they used to be, and for that reason it is now
much more difficult to provide direct or conclusive proof of discriminatory intent. The law
would be as blind as the mythical figure of justice if it did not take account of that reality,
rejecting the use of circumstantial evidence of intent.
Brown v. Artery Org., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 n.26 (D.D.C. 1987).
16. Bronson v. Board of Educ. (Cincinnati), 510 F. Supp. 1251, 1276 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("the
standard [for admitting evidence] is one of relevance" pursuant to Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
17. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
18. Cf Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (using "root" and "branch" meta-
phor in different context: unconstitutional school segregation must be eliminated "root and branch").
19. See Days, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't Anybody Laughing? 95 YALE
L.J. 1737 (1986) (criticizing courts for focusing only on school board).
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limit circumstantial evidence considered relevant to a school board's moti-
vations, thereby excluding evidence of "root" and "branch" discrimina-
tion. Part II argues that because school boards and other municipal actors
respond to constituents' views on matters of race, evidence of community
sentiment and the actions and omissions of other municipal actors can
shed light on a school board's motivations. Part II also demonstrates that
exclusion of relevant evidence of intent in school cases conflicts with estab-
lished judicial doctrine. Part III proposes that courts scrutinize evidence of
the motivations of the community at large and of other municipal actors to
infer school board intent.
I. TREATMENT OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASES: JUDGES WEARING BLINDERS
In school desegregation cases, courts myopically focus only on the school
board, ignoring the larger social context within which the board's deci-
sions are made. While case law in this area involves attempts by plaintiffs
to find a school board liable for the actions of other municipal officials or
community members, rather than to use these actions as circumstantial
evidence of school board intent, the net effect is the same: it unnecessarily
limits the inquiry to the school board to the exclusion of the community
and other municipal actors.2" This trend is illustrated most clearly by an
influential line of cases in the Sixth Circuit.2 The Court of Appeals held
in 1966 that "evidence of alleged discrimination in the public and private
housing markets" is irrelevant in a case against a school board because
such discrimination, if it exists, is caused "by persons who are not parties
to this case and the [School] Board has no power to rectify that situa-
tion."22 In 1974, the Circuit held that "complicity" is required between
the school board and discriminating non-parties to implicate the board.2"
Finally, in 1982, the Circuit refused to examine evidence of discrimina-
20. Typical is Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Austin Independent School District v.
United States, in which he stated that "discrimination in housing-whether public or private-cannot
be attributed to school authorities." 429 U.S. 990, 994 (1976). In Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg
Board of Education, the Court limited its inquiry to the actions of local school authorities, explicitly
ignoring the "myriad factors ... [that] can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways ...." 402
U.S. 1, 22 (1971). The Court has not foreclosed inferring school authorities' intent from others' in-
tent. However, by resolutely affirming a school-board-centered approach, the Court has reinforced
lower courts' tendencies to isolate school authorities from the broader political and social community.
See Note, judicial Right Declaration and Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE L.J. 1741, 1743-52
(1985) (discussing narrowing of Court's school desegregation inquiry).
21. Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963, 968 (6th Cir. 1982) (Akron); Higgins v. Board of
Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 788-89 (6th Cir. 1974) (Grand Rapids); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Bronson v. Board of Educ., 578 F. Supp.
1091 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (Cincinnati); Bronson v. Board of Educ., 573 F. Supp. 767 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(Cincinnati).
22. Deal, 369 F.2d at 60 n.4.
23. Higgins, 508 F.2d at 788.
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tory housing policies by other governmental agencies as indicative of
school board intent.24
Bronson v. Board of Education, a 1983 district court case, epitomizes
the Sixth Circuit limitations on admissible evidence in school desegrega-
tion cases. In that case, plaintiffs attempted to present evidence of wide-
spread Cincinnati housing discrimination to prove that the school board
intentionally discriminated in concert with housing authorities. 25 The
court, however, held that plaintiffs must establish that "the named De-
fendants acted in concert with these non-joined parties ... in bringing
about the racial composition of the challenged school systems."26 Failing
that difficult demonstration, "[p]laintiffs are precluded from attempting to
prove that other parties and/or agencies not before the Court acted with
segregative intent individually and/or independently from the named De-
fendants in creating a de jure segregated community and/or school system
... "" Put simply, as the court stated in a subsequent proceeding in
1984, "the conduct of other entities not named as Defendants . . would
simply have no relevance to the issues properly triable herein. ' 28 Through
this rigid compartmentalization of the school board separate from the rest
of the community, the court heavily increased the plaintiffs' burden in that
case.
2 9
Other courts have agreed with the Sixth Circuit's restrictive approach."0
For example, in the 1984 Norfolk desegregation case, Riddick by Riddick,
the court refused to look at housing discrimination for inferences concern-
ing discrimination in the school system."' According to the Riddick court,
24. Bell, 683 F.2d at 968.
25. 573 F. Supp. at 773.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 774 (emphasis in original).
28. Bronson v. Board of Educ., 578 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1984); see also id. at
1104-05 (evidence of other actors' discrimination irrelevant in action against school board).
29. The case ultimately settled. The court accepted the settlement plan even though, under the
agreement's integration levels, "some school-children, both black and white, will remain in racially
isolated schools." Bronson v. Board of Educ., 604 F. Supp. 68, 76 (S.D. Ohio 1984). The court
accepted the plan in part because of the "significant risks which may have prevented [plaintiffs from]
ultimately prevailing" at trial due to the narrow evidentiary scope the court had allowed plaintiffs
under Bell. Id. at 75; see text accompanying note 26 supra.
30. E.g. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne County Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324, 331 n.15
(4th Cir. 1984) (citing Bell and Bronson); see also Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th
Cir. 1972) (Richmond) ("That there has been housing discrimination in all three [school districts] is
deplorable, but a school case, like a vehicle, can carry only a limited amount of baggage."); Riddick v.
School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814, 825-27 (E.D. Va. 1984) (Norfolk) (citing Bell), affd, 784 F.2d 521
(4th Cir. 1986); Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, slip op. at 32, 42, 94 (W.D. Mo. June
5, 1984) (finding school districts' employment policies, other actors' housing policies, and reputation of
areas as being "inhospitable to blacks" irrelevant to inquiry into school board's liability in interdistrict
case), affd 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986); Brody-Jones v. Macchiarola, 503 F. Supp. 1185, 1236 n.27
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
31. 627 F. Supp. at 826 (finding no discriminatory intent even though board's newly drawn at-
tendance plan resulted in several all-black schools).
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school cases concern "the elimination of dual school systems," not housing
discrimination.3 2
In sum, courts continually have rejected admission of "root" and
"branch" evidence as circumstantial evidence of a school board's intent.
Courts admit such evidence only when plaintiff can prove that the "root"
or "branch" directly caused the school board to act in a discriminatory
way or when the board is responsible for the discriminatory "root" or
"branch" actions.
II. CURRENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IGNORE THE SOCIAL
CONTEXT OF DISCRIMINATION
The atomistic view of discrimination that courts typically hold in school
desegregation cases ignores its pervasive nature in many communities.33
32. Id. (emphasis in original). Three cases, in particular, support this Note's thesis. The Third
Circuit, in Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107, 1115 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 824 (1982),
stated that "'[slchool authorities may not, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, maintain seg-
regated schools or permit educational choices contributing to the development and growth of segre-
gated schools because of community sentiment or the wishes of a majority of voters.'" (quoting lower
court opinion, Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1973)). Similarly, in United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456 F. Supp. 183, 187 (S.D. Ind. 1978), affd in part and
vacated in part, 637 F.2d 1101, 1108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S. 838 (1980) (Indianapolis), the
court ordered interdistrict relief when the state assembly ceased the city's expansion and thus pre-
vented desegregation. The court reasoned that, even though there was no direct evidence of racial
animus by representatives, particularly the suburban representatives must have voted to stop the city
expansion for the express reason of preventing desegregation, because many residents had fled the city
to avoid desegregation of the schools.
The only case in which a court explicitly admitted evidence of "root" and "branch" discrimination
as relevant to determining school board intent, however, is United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624
F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821
(1988). In that case, the court stated that widespread racially-based community and municipal promo-
tion of housing segregation constituted relevant evidence that the school board had intentionally fos-
tered school segregation. Id. at 1489, 1497, 1537. Although Yonkers found that "root" and "branch"
discrimination constituted evidence of school board intent to discriminate, it is unclear whether the
court relied on this evidence in finding the school board liable for intentional discrimination. The
evidence is reflected in only three sentences of a nearly 300-page opinion. In the rest of the opinion,
the court uses evidence of discrimination by other branches of government not to infer evidence of the
school board's intent but to show that the city government and school board acted in concert to segre-
gate Blacks, thus making the school board liable See id. at 1534 (finding "interrelated governmental
effort" by school board and city to foster school segregation). In summarizing the reasons for finding
the school board's failure to implement a desegregation plan to be racially motivated, the court failed
to mention previously-described opposition to housing desegregation. Id. at 1500. Further, the Second
Circuit did not rely on the "root" and "branch" evidence in affirming the opinion. 837 F.2d at 1227,
1232. Yonkers still stands for the proposition that community and municipal discrimination can shed
light on school board motivations. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. Yet no court has
indicated agreement with that portion of the opinion.
33. See Horowitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, in HAVE WE
OVERCOME? 183 (M. Namorato ed. 1979) ("Race in this country has always stood as a constant
reminder of the fact that each individual is not judged solely as an individual."); Lawrence, The Id,
the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330
(1987) ("[Rlacism in America . . . is a part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a
part of our culture. It arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the world, our-
selves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental social activities."); see also Suttles,
supra note 8, at 67. See generally D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (discussing pervasive-
ness and persistence of discrimination); P. WATSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE (1973) (same); Simon,
supra note 13, at 1047-49 (same). The historical evidence bears out discrimination's pervasiveness
2008
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As both political science evidence and documentation from previous civil
rights cases demonstrate, discriminatory action is seldom localized in one
particular body like a school board; racism in a community is not so
neatly compartmentalized.34 By excluding evidence of community senti-
ment and of the actions of other governmental actors, courts incorrectly
treat discrimination as an isolated phenomenon. In so doing, courts have
developed evidentiary standards which diverge from established law in
other civil rights areas.
A. Current Law Fails to Capture the Reality of Discrimination and
School Board Operation
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the actions of school officials can-
not be rigidly separated from those of constituents and other municipal
officials. As David Kirp concludes, school systems are "deeply imbedded
in their political contexts . . . .- Because "[f]or most Americans the rel-
evant unit [of concern] is probably their own jurisdictional community
within which they share such collective goods as education," threats by
minority groups to control these resources will frequently be felt by large
segments of the population.3 6 Indeed, studies and cases indicate that race-
motivated school politics often dominate city politics.37
1. "Roots"
Contrary to the apparent presumption of courts, studies show that
school boards, elected and appointed, 38 are deeply responsive to strongly
across different social institutions. E.g., G. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND
(1971) (describing Whites' beliefs); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944) (describing race
relations in America); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1966) (noting
importance of law in maintaining system of segregation; Jim Crow laws during first half of century in
South applied to all areas of social and political life, subordinating Blacks from cradle to grave be-
cause of belief in white superiority).
34. See izfra notes 35-66 and accompanying text. The phrase "neatly compartmentalized" comes
from an interview with John Tanner, Voting Rights Section, Civil Rights Division, Justice Depart-
ment, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 23, 1988).
35. D. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS 169 (1982); see also I. KATZNELSON, CITY TRENCHES 115 (1981)
(describing interrelation of schools and politics).
36. Suttles, supra note 8, at 67.
37. E.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (voiding referendum on busing
as being racially motivated); P. PETERSON, SCHOOL POLITICS CHICAGO STYLE 153-54 (1976) (Re-
publican and Democratic alders and state legislators from white neighborhoods "found the [1968
desegregation) issue so politically significant that they . . . moved quickly to 'lead' the protest against
the school board."); D. ROGERS, 110 LIVINGSTON STREET 83 (1968) (finding that 1965 New York
mayoral election and 1966 civilian review board referendum became tests of white views of Blacks in
midst of school desegregation battle); see also Northcross v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 18 (6th Cir.
1973) (Memphis) (city council enjoined from "obstructionist tactics with the intent to prevent integra-
tion of the schools" by denying school board gas money), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974); Kelley v.
Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732, 745 (6th Cir.) (Nashville) (city council enjoined
from interfering in desegregation remedy), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972).
38. Thirty-two states and Washington, D.C. exclusively elect school boards, Virginia's are all
appointed, and the other 18 states have both appointed and elected boards. Telephone interview with
Rick Davis, National Association of School Boards, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 28, 1988).
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held community sentiments. Elected school boards are particularly suscep-
tible to segregative community sentiment.3 9 For example, in both Lansing,
Michigan,40 and Richmond, California, 1 the elected school boards voted
to desegregate their schools and were promptly voted out of office in recall
elections. Not surprisingly, in both cases the new boards halted the inte-
gration plan. A school board, knowing the views of the community, will
not want to wait until public opposition is formed to act in accord with
segregative sentiment, nor will a board often risk unpopular desegregative
actions.42
Neither are appointed school boards divorced from the rest of the politi-
cal community: elected officials, after all, do the appointing.43 As the court
in United States v. Yonkers Board of Education44 recognized, opposition
to school desegregation often becomes a criterion for appointment to the
school board. These appointed actors also remain subject to outside pres-
sure. The mayor often holds significant power in a municipality,45 and
electoral pressure may push her to oppose a school board's desegregation
plans.46
As Jennifer Hochschild has observed:
Mayors and school boards win elections presumably because a ma-
jority of the voters endorse their views on controversial, highly visible
issues. . . . [L]ocal officials do not desegregate precisely because
39. Although the school desegregation idea is popular among Whites and Blacks, particularly in a
community with desegregated schools, busing for such purposes is highly unpopular among Whites.
Rossell Desegregation Plans, Racial Isolation, White Flight, and Community Response, in THE
CONSEQUENCES OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 13, 44-45 (C. Rossell and W. Hawley eds. 1983).
Three-quarters of Americans believe that busing for desegregation would be "too hard," although 88
percent of white families who have done so find it very or partially satisfactory. G. STONE, L. SEID-
MAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 492.
40. NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1053 (6th Cir.) (holding rescission of deseg-
regation plan to be evidence of discriminatory intent by school board in context of long-standing dual
school system), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
41. D. KIRP, supra note 35, at 117; see L. RUBIN, BUSING AND BACKLASH 147 (1972) (80%
turnout in precincts where desegregation was most opposed in Richmond; busing advocates were over-
whelmingly defeated).
42. See E.E. SCHATSCHNEITER, A SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 38, 62-77 (1960) (arguing that gov-
ernmental actors often keep an unpopular item off their agenda to prevent public mobilization on the
issue, thus ensuring its defeat in a manner invisible to the public).
43. See S. ELKIN, CITY AND REGIME IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 128 n.8 (1987) (implying
that appointed officials, being "indirectly elected," respond to popular pressure in same way that
elected officials do).
44. 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988).
45. See S. ELKIN, supra note 43, at 29-30 (finding mayors increasingly important relative to city
council and department heads). The city council or mayor's influence over fiscal and other affairs may
significantly affect the other decisions that a school board may make. D. ROGERS, supra note 37, at
431 (finding New York City school board formally and informally dependent for money, school con-
struction, and zoning decisions on city counselors, agencies, and administrators).
46. See, e.g., D. KIRP, supra note 35, at 92 (liberal mayor in San Francisco reversed course and
became leader of opposition to school board's desegregation plan).
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popular control is, in fact, effectively exercised. . . . [W]ere it not for
courts, there would be little reduction in racial isolation.47
2. "Branches"
Studies also show that where one municipal "branch" acts in a racially
discriminatory manner in its own sphere, other branches are likely to do
the same in theirs.4 As Clarence Stone writes, "[flew factors are more
important in the American city today than the factor of race. Housing
patterns, educational policy, attitudes on social policy issues, and employ-
ment opportunities are all intertwined with the factor of race."4 Munici-
pal officials come from the same community and share the local culture,
and this culture often includes racial prejudice.5" In addition, individuals
may take on different roles within municipal government by serving in
various organizations and offices over time.5"
Moreover, a municipality's different "branches" will often discriminate
against minorities as a result of constituent pressure. 2 According to Dan-
ielson and Doig, authors of a study on New York municipalities' exclu-
sion of Blacks and Hispanics,
By and large, suburban governments have been responsive to the
[discriminatory] views shared by so many of their constituents. Local
officials . . . have fostered exclusion by bulldozing black neighbor-
hoods and ignoring the housing needs of those displaced. In addition,
suburban governments have rezoned for commercial use land adja-
cent to black neighborhoods; school officials have frozen and
manipulated school boundaries in order to foster and preserve segre-
gated schools . . . [P]ublic policies . . . [therefore] encourage dis-
crimination and segregation . . ..
Political science literature has confirmed the dependence of municipal
actors on their political and social contexts, 4 particularly concerning mat-
ters of race. First, pluralist studies, focusing on interest group and electo-
ral bargaining, identify innumerable, often non-obvious, interconnections
among city officials.55 These interrelations, as mentioned above, can take
47. J. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 128-29, 134.
48. E.g., J. GREENSTONE & P. PETERSON, RACE AND AUTHORITY IN URBAN POLITICS 312-15
(1973); D. JUDD, POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES 394 (1979); P. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 158-59
(1981).
49. C. STONE, URBAN POLICY AND POLITICS 19 (1979).
50. See D. BELL, supra note 33, at 4-6.
51. See R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961).
52. Municipalities especially respond to community discriminatory views against Blacks and His-
panics. E.g., N. DANIELSON & J. DOIG, NEW YORK POLITICS OF URBAN REGIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT (1982).
53. Id. at 104.
54. E.g., S. ELKIN, supra note 43 (different municipal actors and agencies are interdependent and
understandable only in relation to political and economic context).
55. E.g., E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS (1963); R. DAHL, supra note 51 (studying
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the form of authority over funding and other major decisions, 56 mayoral
appointment powers, job movements by an individual in a municipality,
and social ties. Limiting judicial scrutiny of intent to one agency and its
personnel ignores these reciprocal influences. Second, as economic views of
politics predict, politicians tend to move to the political spectrum's center
in electoral competition, closely reflecting the majority of voters' substan-
tive views on matters of perceived importance. 57 Such studies suggest that
representatives, to retain constituents, will attempt to further their constit-
uents' views on matters of race. Anthony Downs emphasizes that politi-
cians are more likely to respond when the costs of gathering the majority
of constituents' views on a particular issue are low and the intensity of the
views held is high. 58 Because of the easy identification of the emotional
racial issue in a community, politicians in all spheres of government will
either anticipate59 or respond quickly to widespread community animus
against minority groups. Indeed, empirical research on the United States
Congress has indicated that constituents' views on civil rights have closely
controlled the behavior of their representatives.60
Judicial findings in civil rights cases also demonstrate that discrimina-
tion often occurs by municipal officials in different areas of government.
In voting rights cases, for example, courts have often noted the pervasive
character of official discrimination against minorities in widely varying
spheres of municipal government, including schools." Moreover, the Su-
preme Court has frequently noted that segregation in housing and schools
New Haven).
56. See cases cited supra note 37 (describing city council power of the purse over school board).
57. E.g., A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
58. Id. at 64-69.
59. See supra note 42 (discussing government preemption of issues).
60. Miller & Stokes, Constituency Influence in Congress, in EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY
388, 398-401 (C. Cnudde & D. Neubauer eds. 1969). One congressman lost his seat primarily be-
cause he was thought to be "too moderate" on racial issues. Id. Politicians, appointed or elected, often
act concerning school policy in anticipation of a campaign for a new office. E.g., J. RAFFEL, THE
POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: THE METROPOLITAN REMEDY IN DELAWARE 103 (1980)
(suggesting mayor opposed desegregation because of his impending Senate bid).
61. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624-26 (1982) (finding county's at-large system of elec-
tion unconstitutional and that Burke County, Georgia Blacks suffered lingering discrimination in edu-
cation, grand juror selection, county hiring, board and commission appointments, municipal services,
elected officials' responsiveness, and in their nearly total exclusion from political process); Cruz
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 852 F.2d 1186, 1196-98 (9th Cir. 1988) (striking at-large city election
scheme and finding current discrimination against Hispanics in schools, housing, and employment,
and past discrimination with present effects in other areas), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1534 (1989);
McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1044 (5th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's strik-
ing down of at-large voting districts and finding state-enforced discrimination against Blacks in electo-
ral system and in creation of "two separate societies" in which churches, clubs, neighborhoods, and
(until recently) schools remained segregated by race to detriment of Blacks); City of Pleasant Grove v.
United States, 623 F. Supp. 782, 787-88 (D.D.C. 1985) (three-judge court) (invalidating attempted
annexation and finding current discrimination by city in education, housing, zoning, hiring, voting,
and utility policies), affd, 479 U.S. 462 (1987); Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206,
1214 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court) (disallowing preclearance of election plan changes and find-
ing educational, economic, employment, and political discrimination against Blacks).
2012 [Vol. 99: 2003
1990] Attacking School Segregation 2013
is closely linked.6 2 Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs who demonstrate unconstitu-
tional school segregation often prove simultaneous and significant official
housing discrimination."3 For example, the court in Penick v. Columbus
Board of Education 4 found housing segregation caused in part by Fed-
eral agencies, local housing authorities, and local zoning and annexation
practices, and found blatant school segregation by school authorities as
well. Successful civil rights actions concerning mixed subject areas, such as
housing and employment,65 and employment and voting,6 support the
proposition that a municipality that discriminates in one sphere of govern-
ment might well be doing so in others. Courts that ignore discrimination
by public officials other than school board members therefore overlook
how thoroughly racial prejudice often finds expression in a community.
62. E.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465 n.13 (1979) (segregated schools are
contributing cause of segregated neighborhoods); Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1973)
(same); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971) ("People gravitate
toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of people. The location of
schools may thus influence the pattern of residential development . . . ."). There still exists over-
whelming housing segregation that cannot be explained by socioeconomic or ethnic group preferences.
Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications for School Integration, 39 LAW & CONTFNIP.
PROBS. 164, 177 (1975) (difficult for Blacks to move to suburbs regardless of income); U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A SHELTERED CRISIS: THE STATE OF HOUSING IN THE 1980's (1983); see Note,
Housing Discrimination as a Basis for Interdistrict School Desegregation Remedies, 93 YALE L.J.
340, 348-53 (1983) (arguing for government responsibility for housing segregation).
63. See Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 423,
425 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming finding of public and private residential segregation along with school
board liability), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F.
Supp. 1276, 1540 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding both residential school segregation), affd, 837 F.2d 1181
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 456
F. Supp. 183, 188-90 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Indianapolis) (same), aff d in part and vacated in part, 637
F.2d 1101, 1109-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980); Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp.
206, 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (Buffalo) (same), affd in part and rev'd in part, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708, 789-90 (N.D. Ohio
1976) (Cleveland) (same); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 435 (D. Del.) (three-judge court)
(Wilmington) (same), affd per curiam, 423 U.S. 963 (1975); Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp.
410, 470 (D. Mass. 1974) (Boston) (same), aff d sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); NAACP v. Harris, 567 F. Supp. 637, 641 (E.D. Mass.
1983) (noting Boston official housing and hiring discrimination), affd in part and vacated in part,
607 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299,
1304 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (finding school segregation resulting from government acts, includipg discrim-
inatory zoning, city planning, urban renewal, public housing siting, and restrictive covenants), affd,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (not reaching these findings); see also Dee & Huggins, Models for Proving Liabil-
ity of School and Housing Officials in School Desegregation Cases, 23 URB. L. ANN. 111, 149 (1982)
(discus-.ing intersection of housing and school segregation); Note, supra note 62, at 342 (same).
64. 429 F. Supp. 229, 259 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affd and remanded, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978),
aff d, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
65. The Department of Justice found that a pattern of intentional discrimination by town officials
(police, mayor, housing officials, and others) existed in Cicero, Illinois that excluded Blacks from both
residing and working there. The town settled both the housing and employment counts in May, 1986,
soon after the district court indicated that it would reinstate a preliminary injunction on the employ-
ment charge. Telephone interview with James Angus, Chief of the Employment Section, Civil Rights
Division, Justice Department (Nov. 25, 1988).
66. E.g., United States v. Conecuh County, Civ. No. 83-1201-H-S (S.D. Ala. June 12, 1984)
(consent decree in which defendants agreed to refrain from harassing Blacks at polls and to cease
employment discrimination against black poll officials and applicants).
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B. Current Law Fails to Heed Other Areas of Civil Rights Law
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,67 the Supreme Court stated that determining whether a govern-
ment actor harbors discriminatory intent under equal protection standards
requires "a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available" to determine if "discriminatory purpose has
been a motivating factor in the decision."' 68 Courts that exclude "root" and
"branch" evidence as not relevant to school board intent undercut the
Court's command that the search of the available circumstantial evidence
for discriminatory purpose must be vigorous and wide-ranging.6 9
The narrow view courts take of admissible evidence in school desegre-
gation cases is at odds with the acceptance of "root" and "branch" evi-
dence as probative of decisionmakers' intent in other civil rights cases."
1. "Roots"
In voting rights cases alleging denial of equal protection under the laws,
the Supreme Court has endorsed the use of evidence regarding a wide
variety of community practices to infer intentional voting rights discrimi-
nation." In White v. Regester, for example, the Court found "'invidious
discrimination . . .[in] education, employment, economics, health, politics
and others'" against Mexican-Americans and racial campaign tactics and
other discrimination against Blacks to be relevant.72 The Court concluded
that "[biased on the totality of the circumstances .. .and an intensely
local appraisal of the . . . district in the light of past and present reality,
political and otherwise,"73 the district court had correctly found invidious
67. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
68. Id. at 265-66.
69. The Court noted that the "historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source,
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes." Id. at 267. Moreover,
"[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on
the decisionmaker's purposes." Id. Because constituent sentiment and governmental action by those
who are not school board officials frequently constitute the historical background and part of the
events leading up to school board decisions, admitting this evidence is fully compatible with Arlington
Heights. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussion of Federal Rules of Evidence).
70. Norman Chachkin of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund stated that courts have "walled off"
the school board in school desegregation cases because they often dislike the remedy-busing. Tele-
phone interview with Norman Chachkin, New York City (Jan. 26, 1990); cf. Note, Making the
Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 328
(1982) (courts restrict civil rights because of "underlying hostility to broad remedial orders in equal
protection cases"). According to Mr. Chachkin, judges find it relatively easy to implement voting
remedies because they do not involve forced association and because the one-person-one-vote principle
is so attractive. In addition, because comparatively few housing cases have involved an affirmative
housing remedy, such as forcing a municipality to build housing for minorities in a particular neigh-
borhood, judicial isolation of defendants has not developed in housing law.
71. E.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 770
(1973).
72. 412 U.S. at 769 (quoting district court opinion, Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 728
(W.D. Tex. 1972)); see id. at 767-68.
73. Id. at 770-71; see also Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623.
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discrimination. Likewise, in Rogers v. Lodge, the Court considered racial
bloc voting to be probative of responsiveness by an elected county commis-
sion, and thus of its discriminatory intent.74
Lower courts have complied with Supreme Court instructions to con-
sider evidence of community sentiment as indicative of racial motivation in
voting rights cases. One district court found, for example, that the histori-
cal and social context of the community, including extremely polarized
racial bloc voting, had led to intentional discrimination in many spheres of
government and to discrimination in adopting the questioned election plan
as well.75
In housing cases, as well, courts using equal protection clause intent
standards admit evidence of community sentiment without requiring
plaintiffs to show a direct causal link between that sentiment and subse-
quent municipal decisions to oppose housing desegregation. Thus courts
will find that innocent-sounding statements can prove intent in housing
cases when set against a backdrop of community racial animus." This
approach stands in contrast to that used in school cases. For example, the
Yonkers court used wider inferential "root" evidence to find discrimina-
tory purpose in the housing count than it did in the school count.7
74. 458 U.S. at 624 ("Voting along racial lines allows those elected to ignore black interests
without fear of political consequences . . ").
75. City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 991, 1004-08 (D.D.C. 1981), affd,
459 U.S. 159 (1982). Although plaintiffs sued under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(c), the court used the "root" and "branch" evidence to find discriminatory intent as an alter-
native basis for striking down the proposed election plan. Id. at 1019. In United States v. Marengo
County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1567 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984), the court stated
that "[a] history of pervasive purposeful discrimination may provide strong circumstantial evidence
that the present-day acts of elected officials are motivated by the same purpose, or by a desire to
perpetuate the effects of that discrimination." Though Morengo concerned § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, the court stated that "the same evidence is relevant to both [intent under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and effects-based] theories." 731 F.2d at 1574; see also Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494,
516-17 (D.D.C. 1982) (historical and social context relevant under equal protection standards), affd,
459 U.S. 1166 (1983); Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982, 988 (11th Cir. 1986) (municipal services
case); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986) (same).
76. E.g., United States v. City of Birmingham, 538 F. Supp. 819, 826-28 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(finding racially discriminatory intent motivated city and electorate in opposing racially integrated
housing development), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). Compare United States v. City of Parma,
494 F. Supp. 1049, 1097, 1101 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (finding evidence of racially discriminitory intent
in "pattern and practice" case through widespread racially-motivated community opposition to low-
income housing; court found officials "acutely aware" and responsive to this opposition, without dem-
onstration that council would have supported fair housing if there had been no opposition; suburb's
reputation as inhospitable to Blacks was considered relevant), affd in part and rev'd in part, 661
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982) with Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-
CV-W-4, slip op. at 94 (W.D. Mo. June 5, 1984) (school case finding irrelevant reputation of area as
"inhospitable to blacks"), affd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
77. See Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852, 872, 878 (E.D. Va. 1982) (officials' racist state-
ments demonstrated racial intent that rose to level of constitutional violation), affd, 733 F.2d 318 (4th
Cir. 1984).
78. Factors that the court considered in finding illicit housing motivation included evidence of
private market discrimination, longstanding and increasing racial polarization, and the acceptance of
racist opposition to housing desegregation as a fact of political life. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1313, 1370, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988). In addition, the court discussed community prejudices with
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2. "Branches"
Courts have also used discrimination by non-defendant governmental
actors as circumstantial evidence of intent violative of the equal protection
clause in civil rights cases other than school desegregation cases. For ex-
ample, in the voting rights case of Rogers v. Lodge, the Supreme Court
found past and present discrimination against Blacks in education, poli-
tics, grand jury selections, and county hiring, in addition to a lack of re-
sponsiveness to minority concerns by officials, to be indicative of inten-
tional discrimination regarding voting rights.79  Moreover, in City of
Pleasant Grove v. United States, the three-judge district court found that
the city's discriminatory housing, zoning, hiring, education, and utility
policies indicated discrimination in voting as well. The lower court stated
that "[a]s a matter of law, the Court may, and it does, infer on the basis
of this evidence . . that racial bias was the purpose of Pleasant Grove's
[voter] annexation policy."8 This is precisely the approach that this Note
proposes for school cases. The Supreme Court approved the district
court's reliance on a "variety of evidence" to find discriminatory intent.8
Likewise, the District Court for the District of Columbia found that dis-
crimination in such "branches" as schools, housing, employment, and mu-
nicipal appointments and improvements implied that the city also in-
tended to discriminate in voting.82 Finally, in a housing case, the
Northern District of Ohio found that racially discriminatory acts by city
leaders provided sufficient evidence to infer that subordinate local officials
respect to housing segregation, suggesting that such prejudices operate in different spheres of society.
The court noted that city actions condoning segregative housing sentiment made it "all the more
unlikely that individual minorities will be encouraged to try, or that individual whites will be en-
couraged to abandon the attitudes that have erected that [racial] barrier." 624 F. Supp. at 1364 (cita-
tion omitted).
79. 458 U.S. 613 (1982); see also Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (M.D.
Ala. 1986) (finding "pattern and practice" of discriminatory voting requirements by Alabama legisla-
ture resulting from state discrimination in various areas); cf. Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp.
1363, 1378 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (past discrimination in schools and community decisive in concluding
that inequalities in municipal services result from racial discrimination).
80. 623 F. Supp. at 787; see also United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546
(11th Cir. 1984) (finding school discrimination, unresponsiveness by county officials, and variety of
past discrimination evidence of vote dilution; discussed supra note 75), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976
(1984); McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1044 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[Dliscrimination
against minorities outside of the electoral system cannot be ignored in assessing that system."). McMil-
lan arose under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but the court had previously found a Fourteenth
Amendment violation in the same case using the same evidence. 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1982). But see
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("[Eividence of discrimination by white
officials in Mobile . . .[is] tenuous . . . evidence of the constitutional invalidity of the electoral sys-
tem ...."). However, the fact situation in the more recent case of Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 621
(1982), was substantially similar to that in Bolden, in which the opinion received only plurality
support. "Although professing fidelity to Bolden, Rogers allowed for a diametrically opposite result
and liberalized the harsh evidentiary requirements set forth by the Bolden plurality." Note, supra
note 70, at 349. Thus, Rogers' more lenient standards of relevant evidence, in line with this Note's
proposal for schools, apply to constitutional voting litigation.
81. 623 F. Supp. 782 (D.D.C. 1985) (three judge court), affd, 479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987).




intentionally discriminated as well, in accordance with " 'the established,
albeit informal, city policy ... that it was proper' to practice racial
discrimination.18 3
Courts' refusal to permit "root" and "branch" evidence to serve as cir-
cumstantial evidence of intent in school desegregation cases is an anomaly
in civil rights law. The disparate standards of evidence admissible to show
intent prevents advances in school desegregation cases comparable to those
in other fields.
3. Rules of Evidence
Exclusion of evidence regarding "roots" and "branches" also violates
established rules of evidence. According to Rule 401 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, evidence is "relevant" and therefore must be admitted in the
absence of an applicable exclusionary rule84 if it has "any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."85 Courts consider two aspects of relevance under Rule 401.
First, the evidence must be material; that is, it must be offered to prove a
proposition at issue. Second, the evidence must be probative; in other
words, it must affect the probability that the questioned proposition is
true.88 "Root" and "branch" evidence in school desegregation cases meets
both of these criteria. First, it is material because evidence of community
or municipal discrimination is offered to prove the intent of the local
school board. Second, as demonstrated above, community and municipal
discrimination increases the probability that a school board has intention-
ally discriminated.8"
No relevant exclusionary rule exists to bar admission of "root" and
"branch" evidence. Rule 403 allows exclusion of relevant evidence if its
probative value is "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair
prejudice.88 Under this rule, courts exclude evidence for unfair prejudice
when it tends to prove an adverse fact about the defendant not properly at
issue or will unfairly excite emotions against her.89 Here, however, just as
83. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (quoting Arnold
v. Ray, No. C 73-478, slip op. at 4-5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 1979)); cf. Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F.
Supp. 852, 872, 878 (E.D. Va. 1982) (describing city officials' influence in maintaining segregatory
practices among private individuals).
84. FED. R. EvID. 402 (governing admissibility).
85. FED. R. EvID. 401 (governing relevance); see S. SALTZBURC & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES
OF EvIDENCE MANUAL § 401[B] (4th ed. 1986); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5165, at 49 (1978) ("[Elvidence is relevant if it has the slightest bit of probative
worth."); ,e also United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1978) (definition of relevance
is expansive).
86. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 541-42 (5th ed. 1981).
87. See supra notes 33-66 and accompanying text.
88. FED. R. EVID. 403 (governing exclusion of relevant evidence).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. John-
son, 558 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1065 (1978); see also FED. R. EVID.
19901 017
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courts found in the civil rights cases discussed above, circumstantial "root"
and "branch" evidence does not unfairly excite the emotions in an inflam-
matory manner and is rationally connected to the ultimate fact to be
proven-the school board's intent to discriminate.90 Moreover, as the pol-
icy of the Rule generally favors the admissibility of evidence, any doubts
should be resolved in favor of admitting the "root" and "branch"
evidence.91
As demonstrated by both empirical research and the observations of
courts in many areas of civil rights law, communities and municipalities
that discriminate in one sphere of social or political life are likely to do so
in others. Admission of such evidence as relevant to establish school board
intent in desegregation cases would be consistent with empirical fact, cur-
403 advisory committee's note (unfair prejudice is "tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one"). Evidence must be more than "damning"; it
must be "inflammatory." Brady v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 740 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1984) (cita-
tion omitted). The appeal can also be prejudicial by appealing to incorrect logic. See Weit v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 641 F.2d 457, 467 (7th Cir. 1981); Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403:
Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 503-10
(1983) (defining unfair prejudice as that likely to lead to inferential error).
90. The civil rights cases cited supra notes 71-83 implicitly override Rule 403 for non-defendant
"root" and "branch" evidence. See Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130,
1133-35 (4th Cir. 1988) (admitting evidence of racist statements to reveal intent even though emo-
tionally charged and not related to decision at issue; court stated Rule 403 should only "sparingly"
exclude evidence).
91. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDFNCE § 403[031, at 403-46 (1989)
("The usual approach [under Rule 403] ... is to view both probative force and prejudice most
favorably towards the proponent, that is to say, to give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative
force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value."); C. WRIGHT AND K. GRAHAM, supra note 85,
§ 5214, at 263-64. Unfair prejudice must "substantially outweigh" probative worth; thus, to exclude
proffered evidence there must be "significant tipping of the scales" against it. Id. § 5221, at 309.
Finally, if prejudice outweighs probative worth, the judge is not required to exclude the evidence: she
"may" do so. Dente v. Ridell, Inc., 664 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1981).
Rule 404(b) states that "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . may ... be admissible for
... purposes, such as proof of motive, . . . intent, . . . or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R.
EVID. 404(b). The rule's scope is not limited to the defendant's own acts. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 85, § 5239, at 458 n.77 ("Nothing in the rule requires that the other crimes, wrongs, or
acts be those of the person whose character is being proved."). Case law has largely been limited in
this manner, though. See id. § 5239, at 427-68. But see, e.g., United States v. Multi-Management,
Inc., 743 F.2d 1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving conspiracy). However, just as plaintiffs are
allowed to present evidence of other racially discriminatory acts by a defendant to prove intent under
Rule 404(b), see, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 845 (1983); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1981),
plaintiffs should also be able to present evidence of acts of non-defendants in the same community. A
series of discriminatory acts performed by the same defendant increases the probability that the act in
question was done with discriminatory intent. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 207-08 (1973).
Discriminatory acts by other community "roots" and "branches" do the same with regard to the
school board, particularly because Rule 404(b) can apply to a municipal corporation, Lenard v.
Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 896 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983), which is similar to a school
board. A court can, but need not, rely on Rule 404(b) in admitting "root" and "branch" evidence as
probative of school board intent; Rules 401 and 402 alone would suffice. Cf Miller v. Poretsky, 595
F.2d 780, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robinson, J., concurring) (holding past acts of discrimination by
landlord relevant in civil rights action under, and thoroughly discussing, Rules 401, 403, and 404(b));
United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911-14 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that test for Rule 404(b) is,
first, that evidence is relevant under Rule 401 and, second, that probative value outweighs potential
for undue prejudice under Rule 403), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
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rent judicial practice in other areas of civil rights law, and the rules of
evidence.
III. PROPOSAL: A BROADER VIEW OF EVIDENCE RELEVANT IN
DETERMINING SCHOOL BOARD INTENT
Courts should widen the standards of relevance and admissibility of evi-
dence to include both community sentiment and the policies and actions of
a municipality. To do so, courts must weigh this "root" and "branch"
evidence, together with any direct evidence, on a case-by-case basis92 to
determine the motivation of the school board. 93
United States v. Yonkers Board of Education94 illustrates how this type
of evidence can be used to infer intentional discrimination by a school
92. According to the ethnographer Suttles, supra note 8, at 61, 67, communities differ signifi-
cantly in the amount of hostility they display toward minorities. Different judgments about the extent
of discrimination are therefore appropriate in different communities.
The question of which evidence is admissible is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. The district court's weighing of the totality of properly
admitted evidence in a finding of discriminatory intent is a finding of fact, Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-90 (1982), for which there are no ex ante standards. The intent finding is
entitled to considerable deference under the ex post "clearly erroneous" appellate review standards of
FED. R. Ctv. P. 52(a). See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Because the
district court's determination is likely to be binding, it is therefore crucial that the court consider all
relevant evidence, including "root" and "branch" evidence.
93. Courts in voting cases draw an inference of intent from the totality of the circumstances; there
can be no mechanical rule. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982). This is true also of school
cases. See, e.g., Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (Pontiac) (despite
previous case finding no unconstitutional segregation in placement of Pontiac school, finding such
violation is now appropriate because "this Court's consideration ... has been broadened to . . . the
composition of the entire Pontiac School System"), aff d, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 913 (1971).
Courts should take circumstantial "root" and "branch" evidence into account in their inquiry into
the "totality of the relevant facts," Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), to determine
school board purpose. Instead of deciding the issue on a totality of the evidence standard, many courts
have shifted to the school board the burden of proving the constitutional legitimacy of its decisions in
various contexts, once plaintiff's prima facie evidence reached a court-determined threshold. E.g.,
Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 209-10 (1973) (Denver) (shifting burden to school board once
Court found unconstitutional segregation in meaningful portion of school district); Berry v. School
Dist., 442 F. Supp. 1280, 1294 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (shifting burden to school board because of
discrimination in teacher and student assignment and facility conditions); Roseboro v. Fayetteville
City Bd. of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 113, 118 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (history of racial discrimination in
defendant school board's system shifts burden to school board); cf Diaz v. San Jose Unified School
Dist., 612 F.2d 411, 415 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) (raising but not deciding issue). Once a plaintiff has
established evidence regarding "root" and "branch" discrimination beyond the court-determined
threshold level, a court should shift the burden to require the defendant school board to demonstrate
that its decisions are independent of the larger discriminatory community or municipal government.
See Note, supra note 12, at 1407 ("[W]hat is sought [in equal protection cases] is an indication of the
probability that legislative actions have been infected by a race or gender bias. . . . Even if plaintiffs
are unable to demonstrate conclusively that defendants have taken action predicated on illicit consider-
ations of race or gender, the burden of proof on the issue ... might properly shift to defendants ...
.") (emphasis in original); Raveson, Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Sub-
poenafor Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C.L. REv. 879, 988-89 (1985) (court's finding of illicit purpose to
be motivating factor of unknown strength "will be sufficient to shift the burden to the government to
establish that the illicit motivations were not 'but for' cause").
94. 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff d, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2821 (1988); see Days, supra note 19, at 1767 (opinion asks right questions).
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board. In that case, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that the atmosphere of racism in significant and influential
portions of the community and government of Yonkers, as demonstrated
by widespread opposition to housing desegregation, implied that the school
board was also motivated by racial concerns. 5 Although evidence of dis-
crimination in areas besides housing may be relevant in future school de-
segregation cases,96 the Yonkers opinion demonstrates a perceptive and ho-
listic understanding of how discrimination often manifests itself in a
community."
A. Courts Should Admit "Roots" Evidence
In examining the "roots" of discrimination, courts should consider,
among other things, the history of racism in a community,98 the character
of the electorate, 9 the political and social context of the particular com-
munity, 00 and the community's attitudes towards minorities at the time of
the alleged infractions. If segregation is a deeply held custom in a commu-
nity, and the community's decisions generally reflect community racial an-
imus, these facts should be considered in determining the motivation be-
95. See supra notes 32, 78.
96. For example, plaintiffs in Rocky Mount City Bd. of Educ. v. Nash County Bd. of Educ., No.
89-836 (E.D.N.C. filed May 4, 1989), allege that defendant Nash County School Board (1) operated
a dual school system that by purpose and effect operated as a "white haven," attracting Whites from
the city school district and determining residential patterns, and (2) set the boundary between the two
school systems to increase the number of Whites in the system. See Complaint at 2-3, 5-14. The
Rocky Mount plaintiffs' case would be strengthened if the court allowed evidence of widespread dis-
crimination by various elements of the county government to provide an indication of the motivations
of the county school board. According to Susan Perry, Executive Director of Eastern Carolina Legal
Services, the Nash County government acts in a racially discriminatory manner toward black commu-
nities in the county by, for example, providing inadequate water and sewer services as compared to
those provided to predominantly white areas. She also sees a "total oversight" of the interests of the
black residents in the economic development policies of the county. Telephone interview with Susan
Perry, Wilson, N.C. (Nov. 26, 1989).
97. 624 F. Supp. at 1316, 1364, 1370, 1488-90, 1497-1500, 1533-37, 1544-45. One advantage
of bringing more than one discrimination count simultaneously, as the plaintiffs did in Yonkers, is to
make widespread discrimination explicit and thus more believable for each count. See supra notes
65-66 and accompanying text. There are many reasons, however, for plaintiffs to bring only a school
case: other counts may already have been litigated; plaintiffs may lack resources or reason to bring
additional counts; or the lawyers may lack expertise or have strategic reasons for bringing just one
count.
98. The use of this factor is not unprecedented with respect to past school segregation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975); see also
Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dist., 554 F.2d 1353, 1357 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding discrimination
in teacher rehirings by school system and noting relevance of past school segregation in district:
"Overnight changes in racial attitudes, as we have sadly noted in the last twenty years, are rare.").
99. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating state referendum
restricting authority of school board to make desegregative decisions); Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S.
385, 392 (1969) (approving judicial scrutiny of electorate motivation in equal protection ease involving
referendum requiring fair housing ordinance previously passed by city council to first be approved by
majority of voters).
100. See Simon, supra note 13, at 1103 ("[Clontemporaneous social-political conditions ... may
shed light on the motivation with which a specific membership institution acted ... [because] institu-
tions usually reflect and respond to the socially and politically dominant values in the community ...
.").
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hind a school board's actions. 10 In addition, if racial concerns overwhelm
other issues at a particular time, 102 this too should be considered. Factors
such as formal and informal ra~ial policies of dominant social institutions,
racial bloc voting, campaigns based upon race, and extreme segregation in
housing or social life should also serve as circumstantial evidence of a
school board's intent, just as these factors do in voting rights cases. Evi-
dence might include newspaper articles, testimony of observers and af-
fected parties, flyers and letters, statements by segregation proponents, de-
scriptions of racially hostile audiences,"0 3 and sociological studies of racial
attitudes,' 0 ' as well as objective social and political conditions.
B. Courts Should Admit "Branches" Evidence
Courts should also consider actions of other municipal officials as cir-
cumstantial evidence of the motivation underlying school board decisions,
including the municipality's employment policies; fair housing, zoning,
and land use decisions; racial rhetoric of politicians; voting rights viola-
tions; discrimination in the provision of municipal services; and unrespon-
siveness by officials to minority concerns.'0 5 Evidence of discriminatory
acts by school board members in other areas of life, relationships between
school board members and other officials implicated in discrimination, or
a common language employed by opponents of desegregation in different
contexts should be admissible as well.
101. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (finding segregative attitudes so
pervasive that they had force of law); Yonkers, 624 F. Supp. at 1316 (finding city officials acquiescing
in housing discrimination because opposition to desegregation was "fact of life" in community).
102. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding opposition to
school desegregation at particular time "akin to panic"), affd in part and re,'d in part, 573 F.2d
134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978); D. YATES, THE UNGOVERNABLE Crry 108 (1977)
(racial issues at times become highly symbolic, "angry, polarizing, [and] emotional").
103. In Yonkers, the newspaper articles were admitted as evidence for the housing count, and the
rest of the preceding forms of evidence mentioned in the text were admitted for the school count. 837
F.2d at 1221, 1231.
104. See Bronson v. Board of Educ., 578 F. Supp. 1091, 1105-06 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (mentioning
racial perception surveys as possible form of evidence).
105. According to Norman Chachkin, attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, courts in
voting cases have looked, and in school cases should look
more broadly at the question whether the local body listens to complaints of black citizens at
all, whether or not they are connected to claims of racial discrimination. [This is] . . . the
germ of nonresponsiveness - that all kinds of mundane, ordinary complaints or petitions from
citizens become racial discrimination issues when they are voiced by black citizens to a board
or body which doesn't deal with blacks like other folks ...
Letter from Norman Chachkin to author (Dec. 25, 1988).
A judge always has the option of joining another municipal defendant pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P.
19(a) if she feels that fairness requires giving the other "branch" the opportunity to defend itself
against allegations of racial discrimination.
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CONCLUSION
Just as the Fifth Circuit criticized a district court for treating "each
school as an island," in a school desegregation case,106 this Note criticizes
courts for treating school boards as islands, separate from and uninflu-
enced by the larger communities and the municipal governments in which
they are situated. To fulfill the mandate of eradicating unconstitutional
school segregation "root" and "branch," courts must admit circumstantial
evidence of community sentiment and actions of other municipal officials
as potential proof that a school board has acted with discriminatory intent.
106. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518, 525 (5th Cir. 1979).
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